Introductory Remarks

In his review of Sociology in Iran, published in the last issue of Critique, Luis Perez Martinez raises a set of questions about post-revolutionary intelligentsia in the Third World. He does so by using our book as an example of the theoretical weakness of such an intelligentsia. I respect and accept this as his judgement and do not wish to argue against. However, in his review he vaguely describes our effort as one which has watered down its political content or has abandoned critical theory in favor of "mainstream sociology with all its scientific and objectivistic pretensions" (1992: 67). Our effort is depicted as "an emerging consensual discourse" which attempts to "create a shelter for the survival of an intelligentsia which teeters on a tight rope between the Western academic establishment and their local ruling elites" (66). Although he does not find us guilty of committing the related sin of co-opting "critical categories for the service of mainstream social science," he thinks that our book is "susceptible to being co-opted" (66). Such a characterization, I believe, is unfair and based on intellectual utopianism.

Although I believe that responding to critics is necessary and an author's right, I generally like to leave judgement to the readers. However, this time I am forced to respond because at the end of his review Martinez hopes that his "treat[sic] will promote a serious debate among actors of different social
formations who share similar concerns" (72). He rightly believes that
"intellectuals, particularly scholars, have the tendency of interpreting criticism
with a competitive sense" (72).

Based on this call, I thought I should only take the high road and write
about post-revolutionary intellectuals without challenging any of his comments
on our work. However, the more I read his review, the more I find it difficult
not to respond to some of his charges. His review does not describe the book
but instead is a polemic, filled with seriously misleading impressions. Quibbling
aside, I feel obliged to respond to some of his comments which misrepresent the
work and question our motivations.

In the following, I first make some general comments about the issues raised
by Martinez and then respond to specific points he made about our work.
Before I begin, it is important to note that the following is my response to
Martinez’s review. Ali Lahsaeizadeh, co-author of the book, has neither seen
Martinez’s review nor my response to it. The views and responses expressed
in this article are all mine and Lahsaeizadeh has the right to dispute any view
I may attribute to him.

**Intellectuals, Criticality, and Contemporary Crises**

Martinez begins his argument by observing that “given the current
conditions of theoretical and social debate in many countries, especially Third
World countries, we may have the impression that the last 30 years of critical
A lot has happened.

On an objective level, capitalism has changed a great deal from the 1970s.
Though the system has maintained its general exploitative nature, its working
now is subject to new politico-economic forces which necessitate a fresher
understanding of it. Soviet experiment with socialism has also failed and many
Third World revolutionary regimes are turning to privatization of their
productive systems. On a theoretical level, critical sociology is certainly
different today than it was in the 1970s. Post-modernist theories are challenging
both postivist and critical theories. The failure of many Third World
revolutions and the emergence of a “new world order” have created a new crisis
for the Third World intellectuals—a crisis grounded in the recent technological,
political, and economic global currents challenging all ideological currents.

The major question here is: Have we learned enough from these changes?
Have Third World intellectuals been able to sort these changes out and find for
themselves what went wrong in those so-called progressive revolutions? Why
have the outcomes of these revolutions been so unexpected? Were intellectuals
wrong in their theories of their cultural, social, political, economic conditions?
What about all the various movements of one kind or another that emerged in
the 1970s? Did something go wrong with those movements? Or, were those intellectuals wrong about them to begin with? Or both?

I surely do not believe that the deterioration of conditions for political praxis in the Third World is to be blamed on the Third World intellectuals. But I believe that a great number of progressive intellectuals in the Middle East, with which I am most familiar, had an inadequate understanding of what was happening in these countries. However, whatever the past, the challenge of the current situation is so critical that there is little time to be wasted bickering about the past. Today, the problems of the post-revolutionary Third World intellectuals are no different than the problems of intellectuals in the advanced capitalist world. The global problems of exploitation, poverty, inequality, racism, sexism, and ecological imbalances have generated new contradictions which require new and creative conceptual approaches.

The challenge of contemporary intellectuals is not to “save” the old ideologies but to create theoretical categories which can explain the new contradictions while helping to explain and solve old persistent problems of inequality and exploitation. For Third World intellectuals, solutions to new crises are not to be found in the old bipolarity of capitalist and communist ideologies. The appropriate response to the challenges the new world order poses for Third World countries should be guided by a profound understanding of the critical forces shaping modern productive and reproductive relationships in the global community.

Moreover, the new realities of the post-Cold War Third World require not only a new approach to this condition but also a new critical approach to our old theories and practices. In developing this new critical approach, I worry more about our “commitment” to realistically solving old problems than about preserving our old positions. The more people acquire sociological tools and imagination, the easier it is to develop a common critical discourse in the society. Such a concern does not mean that we have opportunistically given up our values or have lost our “integrity.” Not at all. By redefining relationships between sociologists and business, government, and other groups in our book, we have neither given up our principles nor lapsed into a neo-liberal relativism. Definitely, things still have their place. However, the more we know about various things, the better we can judge their socio-historical capabilities.

To begin with, we need to shake the dust of ideological utopianism off ourselves. What is the essence of “critical,” if we are not still critical of our own failures? How can we call ourselves “critical” while closing our eyes to new realities, no matter how much unpleasant and unsettling? In the pre-revolutionary Iranian situation, critical intellectuals closed their eyes to realities of the Iranian society by continually dismissing various elements of the Iranian history, culture, and social structure because these simply did not fit into the imported progressive models. Religious forces were defined as reactionaries
whose historical time had passed (Jazani 1978 and w.d.; Noorala 1978; Tabari 1975) What happened then? I think the outcome speaks for itself.

“Critical” does not mean being selective in understanding social and historical realities. Critical means being committed to the understanding of all aspects of a phenomenon by viewing it from all possible angles. A critical approach is emancipatory because its subjects become fully aware of the historical potentialities and constraints of their situation.

As for Iranian intellectuals, although this is not the time for inaction, it is no time for over-reaction either. Given the complexities of the post-revolutionary realities of Iran, given the widespread disillusion with the conventional political praxis, and given the bankruptcy of packaged radical ideologies of the former Soviet establishment, it is time for those who really believe in critical thinking to become critical of the uncritical utopianism -- a utopianism founded on both good intentions and unrealistic assessment of the situation in Iran. To achieve political, social, and economic democracy, a critical intellectual should be ready to work in all areas of society, be it government, church, school, city hall, business, and community organizations. Such a critical effort involves more than academic theorizing and political slogans. Such a critical effort means to equip real actors, be they workers, students, government bureaucrats, or businessmen, with critical logic or critical analysis of empirical data. That means democratization of science and knowledge.

As much as it is necessary to remain committed to eradication of persistent injustices, it is also necessary to develop an adequate tool for understanding these injustices. That tool is definitely social science. Neither a Western social science, nor an Eastern social science but a universal critical social science grounded in emancipatory conditions of human experience and devoid of manipulations and distortions. Such a social science should have both universalistic and particularistic capabilities allowing it to avoid both parochialism and ethnocentricity.

The best thing a progressive intellectual can do in this period of intellectual confusion on the left is to create more and better conditions for democratization of practical and theoretical experiences in the society. The failure of revolutionary movements in the Third World, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the persistent inability of capitalism to provide a comprehensive and humane response to the needs of all members of the global community are adequate reasons for creating an open, democratic, and progressive environment for critical examination of human options to the persistent problems of distorted allocation, utilization, and appropriation of both natural and human resources. A pre-condition for discovery of humane, practical, and effective alternatives to out-moded categorizations, in order to face the challenges of our new age, is a
democratically-oriented environment in which the dialogue does not find itself
limited by artificial boundaries. The boundaries of the dialogue should be
established consensually, that is based on the full participation of all active
members of the community. The parameters of the discourse should be set in
democratically grounded realism and not in dogmatically guided idealism.

Martinez argues that theoretical praxis among post-revolutionary intellectuals
is weak. I do not wish to speak about intellectuals in all Third World countries,
but I agree that such is the case among the Iranian intellectuals. Our problem
is that for too long our theoretical works have been dominated by outside
thinking so much so that we barely have had any theoretical production of our
own. (Again, in saying so, I worry more about relevance than the source.) We
have often tried to adjust our “realities” to “theoretical models” which
originated from different experiences. It is partially for this reason that in
confronting the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Iranian secular intellectual,
particularly on the left, was historically incapable of confronting it. Of course,
this failure had something to do with the repression by the Pahlavi regime and
by the newly emerging ruling clergy. But the failure of the left was not just
political. Political failure of the Iranian left was partially due to its theoretical
failure. The pre-revolutionary Iranian left did not have the theoretical capacity
of confronting such a revolution. There is not, of course, a single cause for
such a problem. This is symptomatic of an underdeveloped situation in which
the Iranian intellectual found him/herself. Even during the revolutionary period,
usually known as “the spring of freedom,” overwhelming array of covert and
overt forces worked to forestall the influence of critical intellectuals among the
Iranian public.

To break out of it, we need to at least do four things: (1) To rid ourselves
of incapacitating theoretical dogmatism. (2) To avoid uncritical importation of
outside models and theories to our situation. (3) To apply critical analysis not
only to the conditions of oppression, exploitation, and distortion but also to our
own praxis. (4) To try to develop a creative common language based on
rationality and science.

We can accomplish these four goals only with an open mind and deep
appreciation for learning from all sources of information. Here is where
sociology comes in. We view sociology as a critical social science whose task
is not only to understand the society but also to critique it and generate adequate
theoretical knowledge for changing it. Such knowledge, however, does not, and
should not, prevent sociology from leaving its intellectual and academic ivory
tower and making itself available to more people in society.

Any theoretical work should be grounded in practice. Practice does not take
place in vacuum. The critical analysis of any situation requires an appropriate
level of involvement in that situation. A critique from outside can only be
partially effective because it takes place in a vacuum. A critical science not just
influences its subject matter but is influenced by it too. It is this mutual interaction between the knower and the known, the subject and object, the concept and reality, and the theory and practice which makes knowing a critical and meaningful act. Of course, this kind of praxis involves both risks and rewards. The world out there does not guarantee anything for us. It is the level of our understanding and effort which insures our success.

Martinez and Sociology in Iran:

In raising issues of post-revolutionary intelligentsia, Martinez makes numerous critical comments about *Sociology in Iran*. Some of these comments misrepresent our work. In the following, I will discuss these comments in light of the above discussion.

Martinez claims that our work offers an analysis which is liable to being co-opted by power centers and the academic establishment. He bases his view on our suggestion that the Iranian sociologists “should begin to see the private sector as a viable source of research support” (Mahdi and Lahsaieizadeh 1992: 109) or should seek “employment in business, industry, government…” (Ibid.: 108). Martinez seems to believe that our work lacks proper critical balance and that the “informative” aspect of our analysis could be used by reactionary forces. He discusses the content of our book in the context of “technico-theoretical information that serves (or at least give the impression that it could serve) counter-insurgency techniques or social control policies” (1992: 66). How? What kind of information have we produced? What secrets have we revealed? What should we do? Should we not study and present information about our societies? Did this book receive a penny from any foundation or agency in the United States? Does Martinez know that I have become such an intellectual proletarian that I did not even get any usual credit (financial support, time release, secretarial support, etc.) for working on the book? Don’t colonial masters have their own translators and informants who read all relevant information about their particular society of interest? What is wrong with production of knowledge? To challenge the informative aspects of a work because of possible “use” or “misuse” of that information by powers-to-be is damning by association.

Although I agree that intelligence agencies regularly utilize scientists or their work for their intelligence purposes, I strongly oppose even discussing this book in that connection. Such a characterization, I believe, is based on misunderstanding of both the process and product of scientific activities. The merit of science is its openness. Science and scientific activity, if they are intended to be relevant to and useful for people, should remain public. It is the task of critical sociology to challenge the secrecy, elitism, and exclusivity which surround modern science. Critical praxis should aim at creating open, self-
determining, equitable, and fulfilling communities of scientific interest among the public. Given the complexities of scientific production, science can no longer rely on academic relationships as the hub of educational organization, particularly when understood and managed in a social-democratic manner. It is for this reason that we have advocated taking sociology to all walks of life, be it government, business, civic communities, and so on.

Seeing our work as one capable of being co-opted by Western academic establishment and native ruling elite, Martinez claims that for “tactical reasons” we have awarded the status of “science to the Islamic school of thought under scrutiny” (1992: 68). No, we have not. We have been honest in reporting what Islamic social thinkers call their craft. They often call their work “science” and identify themselves as ‘alim (scientists), mohaqeq (researchers), and daneshmand (scholars). If their categorizations are “simplistic,” it is theirs.

Against our discussion of contextuality and historical specificity of sociological analysis, Martinez argues that these and related concepts are themselves “Western” and their opposition to modernity is misleading (1992: 68). First, where did we put concepts like “dialectics,” “specificity,” and “social sciences” in opposition to “modernity?” We agree that all these concepts are historically “modern.” How does this fact nullify our position on the question of indigenous vs. universal? Have we become so “fundamentalist” or “purist” that we cannot accept anything Western, regardless of its virtues? The reason the Iranian intellectuals have been concerned with the historical origins of social theories is that they may not be fully relevant to the Iranian context. Relevance is the issue and not the origin.

Martinez says that the concepts in question could have been developed in other cultures. As a matter of fact they have. Islamicists argue that many of the tools, methods, and concepts being used by the Western social scientists were developed in Moslem societies long before Westerners knew anything about them (Tavanayan Fard 1982). I agree with these critics that there is a great deal of cultural chauvinism and ethnocentrism in Western social sciences, in particular sociology. There is also a great deal of evidence demonstrating the instances of de-valuation or silencing of the Third World contributions to science (Said 1978; Ahmed 1988). But these facts are irrelevant to the merits of sound and reasonable procedures of scientific inquiry.

Martinez argues that the imposition of Western theories and methodologies is the function of politics and not epistemology (1992: 68). That if Islamic states were in a hegemonic position they would probably have done the same. Hypothetical situations aside, did we argue any differently? It has been our position that knowledge claims are grounded in political, social, cultural, and economic realities. The inherent universalization of Western social science models are based on the Western political hegemony. However, this should not prevent us from demonstrating the epistemological problems in such a position.
Anchoring themselves in the claims of objectivity and value-neutrality, Western social sciences have often claimed universal validity and reliability. We, along with others, argue that this is not the case. Such a position, Martinez says, was “first developed not by Third World intellectuals, but from within the tradition of critical European thought.” He believes that criticisms we offered against Western social sciences have “already been extensively developed by dozens of Western critical theorists from Nietzsche to Foucault” (:67). Did we claim otherwise? Did we claim authorship for these positions? Does not Martinez tells us in his review that we should not worry about the “source” but “hegemony?”

Martinez thinks that our comparative analysis of Western sociologies with Islamic sociology is “confusing” and conducive to “false synthesis” (:69). We accept the blame, if our presentation is confusing, even to one reader. But we neither had the intention nor interest in the synthesis Martinez refers to. We simply reported the kind of differences most Moslem social thinkers see between their views and those of Western social scientists. Examples of such comparisons can be found in Surush (1983) and Radmanesh (1983).

Martinez believes that our comparative presentation of Islamic sociology and Western sociologies is “reductionist” and “inaccurate” because “Western sociology is not at all based on the notion of individual as the initial datum of society,....,” but rather on “the group” (:69). Again, we just reported what we have detected in the Islamic literature. Our presentation should be viewed in the context of a major confusion in the literature on the Islamic social science. As mentioned in our book (:84-85), this literature is so scattered, unspecific, ahistorical, and vague that it makes it difficult to sort out various arguments. A major confusion in this literature is between values and methodology. Many Islamic thinkers do not make a clear cut distinction between the two. Not only do they argue against the separation of the two—a position shared by the critical theorists as well—but also they argue that religious values should be used as a methodological guide. The latter, of course, is in contradistinction to Western scientific methodologies. Many Moslem thinkers often confuse the Western value of individualism with methodological unit of analysis. For example, in hopes of establishing a dialogue with Islamic social science, Theodore P. Wright provides an argument in critique of Western comparative political analysis by referring to its biases:

... the built-in European (Judaico-Christian or secular-humanist) biases [are]: 1) secularism; 2) materialism; 3) analysis which distinguishes subcategories but often fails to integrate them in a holistic manner; 4) unilinear development according to a European historical model; 5) liberal individualism which values freedom and democracy over order and community; 6) quantification instead of qualitative criteria; 7) egalitarianism; 8) empiricism; and 9) pragmatism. (Quoted in Abu-Rabi 1991: 335)

In this example, methodological issues of quantification, empiricism, and holistic
vs. atomistic (elementalist) approaches are presented in the same context and with the same weight as substantive issues of egalitarianism, pragmatism, collectivism vs. individualism, materialism, and secularism.

Martinez is right that a careful reading of Durkheim reveals a great deal of similarity between him and the Islamic social scientists. As a matter of fact, this has been the focus of several comparative works (Arjomand 1982, Shahpari 1992). However, it should be remembered that although Durkheim’s emphasis was often on collective representation, as external social facts, and had very little to say about individuals, he acknowledged the normative orientation of modern society toward individualism—something that worries Durkheim as much as it concerns Moslem social scientists. Islamic literature is full of criticisms of the Western values of “individualism,” “the cult of the individual” (using Durkheim’s phrase), and egoism.

Martinez argues that our “summarization” of the comparative position of the “Islamic sociology” versus the Western sociology is a “simplistic” effort in “folklorizing” Iranian culture by describing “it with alien eyes”(69). I do not know how he came to view our description of the Islamic sociology as a characterization of Iranian culture? Nowhere in this book we have attempted to even present, let alone folklorize, Iranian culture. We have described Islamic sociology as its proponents see it. For good or bad, simple or sophisticated, that is what these folks believe in. Our aim in the book was to provide an exposition of their views, perspectives, and conceptualizations. We did not choose to engage in a critical appraisal of “Islamic sociology.” Such an appraisal was necessary and could be done. However, it was not done and that is a weakness in our effort.

We have also been accused of engaging in the colonizing enterprise of “simplifying the Iranian culture” because of presenting “simplistic notions of Islam as ‘sociology’” and “labeling Marxist sociology as alien to Iranian society”(70). As for the first one, I cannot find even one sentence in the book equating Islam with sociology. To us, Islam is a religion and sociology is an academic discipline. What Martinez is really critical of is associating “sociology” with Islam. The fact is that this is not a label we have awarded Islam. As mentioned earlier, Moslem social thinkers have been using this term for a long time (al-Faruqi and Naseef 1981; Hojjati 1990; Jannati 1990). As our chronicle of the term indicates in the book, its use goes back to 1960s. During 1960s and 1970s, Moslem modernists began to utilize the language of modern social sciences in order to explain their social views (Mahdi, 1992). At that time the Iranian left simply dismissed these ideas as “reactionary,” “backward,” and “irrelevant.” On the right, these ideas were viewed as “traditional” and “unscientific” so that no social scientist bothered to deal with them seriously, let alone critically. Of course, a critical appraisal of these views in Iran, both before and after the revolution, has never been easy, a la Rushdie. As a result,
when the religious leadership pulled a model of Islamic government out of its sleeve, the Iranian intellectuals were caught by surprise. Not many intellectuals, on the left or right, academic or non-academic, had studied Ayatollah Khomeini’s treatise on government, Velayate Faqih (1979). Surprised? Yes. When Ayatollah Khomeini was busy establishing a constitution on the basis of ideas expressed in this work, the Iranian intellectuals still were judging him by his interviews in France! Such a failure on the part of progressive and critical intellectuals has been historically costly.

As for the charge that we have misjudged Iranian Marxism, it seems that we would have been more susceptible to this kind of charge before the Iranian revolution, during which the Iranian left was really in theoretical amnesia. Today, you hardly find an Iranian Marxist who does not agree with our statement that in the context of a “relatively hostile ideological environment of an Islamic society” (67) radical sociology remained ineffective and did not produce works of lasting effect. We have said that Marxist sociology was alien to Iranian society. Is this statement any different from what Martinez argues at the beginning of his review: that all these [sociological] ideas were first developed within the tradition of critical European thought? We clearly have stated that Marxism failed in Iran because of a repressive political structure, a hostile ideological environment, and the lack of an adequate level of theoretical, ideological, and organizational work by the left itself. Certainly the prevailing sectarian attitudes among the Iranian left has also contributed to this failure. To say this, does not mean that we have relied on the Western characterization of Marxism in Iran. Reflecting back on the thirty years of work by the left in Iran, many Iranian left activists and academicians say the same thing (Chesmianaz 1992; Showkat 1989)

As for the further charge that we have implied that an “effective” critical sociology is a co-optive one, I can not find the slightest clue to this effect in our text. I wish Martinez had given us one. We simply stated that radical sociology in Iran, due to those factors we mentioned, was not as effective as it could have been. How can such a specification be generalized? We did not even define “effectiveness,” which might be a shortcoming in our presentation. But how does Martinez view such a characterization as co-optive? I believe that this interpretative misunderstanding arises from the general categorization of our work as a consensual or co-optive work.

Be that as it may, I should say that I disagree with Martinez that describing cultures as more or less “religious,” “spiritual,” or “collective,” is a colonial act (70). I cannot convincingly make the generalization Martinez makes, but I can surely demonstrate that the twentieth century Iranian social and cultural (even religious) literatures, of both conservative and radical bent, are full of this kind of characterization. Although I find such claims chauvinistic and unnecessarily parochial, they provide a form of conceptual space for cultural
identity, especially in view of the Western claims of cultural superiority. Fanon was worried about the negative impact of this kind of folklorizing on the psyche of the colonized individual. Even though it provides a temporary defensive relief, the inherent parochial attitude promoted by this kind of folklorizing may have more and longlasting effects on the psyche of the colonized individual.

Comparing our chapter on Islamic sociology to "manuals developed by the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union" and describing our characterization of Islamic view of society as "folklorizing," Martinez writes: "If Islamic sociology is based on the general assumptions about Islamic culture described in this book, I suspect that Fanon's argument may very well describe this breed of intellectuals. I cannot accept that Iranian culture is so simple." (70-71) Where did we ever try to describe Islamic culture? Where did we equate "Islamic culture" with "Iranian culture?" Furthermore, our work was neither an effort to develop a theory of Iranian sociology nor of Iranian culture. The first is a task not yet done (neither in Iran nor outside of Iran) and the second is a task beyond the scope of our work. Our work was an attempt to provide an understanding of the structural situation in which modern sociology is practiced in Iran. While we have done so with our theoretical orientation, we have only offered a theoretical position on the issue of indigenization.

Martinez argues that the problem with our critical analysis is that it criticizes Western models because of their origin not because of their domination. We have argued against both the "hegemonic" and "ethnocentric" characters of these theories. How does showing the parochial biases of a model validate their hegemonic domination? Martinez's statement that "these dominant models should be criticized, not because they are Western or religious, but because they are dominant" (70) confuses analytical discussion with political strategy. No critical theorist is opposed to utilizing appropriate methodology for studying social reality. What a critical sociologist opposes is not the dominance of an appropriate model but the dominance of an oppressive, inappropriate, biased, or ineffective model. Blind objection to empiricism just because it is advocated by Western sociologists reminds me of Stalinist intellectuals who, in their dogmatic zeal to oppose anything from the capitalist world, defined sociology as a bourgeois science, a science that three decades later produced a group of intellectuals who were willing to question the legitimacy of many of the notions upon which that same science was operating.

The time has come to combine revolutionary zeal with pragmatic reasoning so that we can achieve a balanced perspective on realities of our profession, society, and our time. I sometimes wonder if this kind of purist notion of science continue to exist, whether advocated by a puritan Moslem, Christian fundamentalist, nationalist demagogues, radical utopianists, or political imperialists, what would be left of science? It should be emphasized that I have
no illusion about scientific sociology and understand the inherent flaws of depoliticized positivistic scientism and its ideological role in the development and management of domination. Our concern for empirical and useful studies was based on our interest in avoiding both mindless scientism, demonstrated in positivistic quantitative studies in sociology, and the interpretative studies marred with abstract theoretical schema devoid of objective relevance.

Having said that I should also argue that in the final analysis social science should be subject to rational, empirical, or experimental examination. Social scientific knowledge has to be grounded in praxis. Praxis has two meanings here: (a) That social science should be relevant and useful for changing society and serving its members. (b) That scientific information has an objective referent, including information about subjective phenomena. That science means practical engagement with the world, not a distanced understanding of such a world. A statement from Lukacs should serve as a good ending:

Science entails the end of anthropomorphism; it is the mirror image of objective reality. But this mirroring of reality is not a fact which is merely experienced: the contribution of man is essential. In this sense science is not absolute and impersonal; it is a product of history, i.e., of individuals acting historically. Before Marx, already Hegel had recognized that men literally create themselves through their productive activity. Scientific categories are not immutable, as the positivists and neo-positivists used to say and still say: they, too, are linked to the historical development. (Ferrarotti 1972: x-xi)

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