In the prewar period, both the Turkish and the Arab nationalists were intent on forming a solid nationalist ideology. Under the CPU, official and popular sentiment started to embrace Turkish nationalism. The Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocagi), founded after March 1912, was a side organization of the CPU whose original duty was to advocate Islamism and Ottomanism. But they were also trying to convince Turkish people that the only way for the empire to survive was to embrace Turkish nationalism. The Turkish Hearth was also responsible for propagating the use of Turkish instead of other languages. Under CPU pressure, government officials increased the use of Turkish in government administration, and as the religious schools and courts came under state control, Turkish started to predominate. The immigrating Caucasian and eastern European Turks participated in these developments, and a project to unite all the Turks, or all the Turanian peoples, began.

After 1914 the notion of Arab independence emerged, along with the possibility of the Ottoman Empire's fall and the inevitability of subsequent foreign hegemony. Many such ideas were current in Beirut, Damascus, and Basra, where the independence movements in the Balkans had already been noted and the Young Turks had been active. Triggered by an alliance between Sharif Husayn of Mecca and the British, in 1916, the Arab Revolt started the separation of Arab lands from the Ottoman Empire.

During World War I, the Ottoman Empire proved incapable of fighting on a scale equal to the European forces. The end of the war in 1918 also signaled the end of the Young Turks era. After the ensuing war for independence, the new Turkish republic was formed, owing much of its social infrastructure to the Young Turks. Although under the CPU the state ideology remained Ottomanist and Islamicist, the emergence of non-Turkish Muslim nationalist movements among the Balkan and Arab populations strongly influenced Turkish intellectuals and statesmen. The major intellectual development of the Young Turks era was Turkish nationalism. The secular ideas of Young Turks leaders like Ziya Gökalp found popular support long after the CPU.

See also Modernization, Political: Administrative, Military, and Judicial Reform; Revolution: Modern; Young Ottomans.

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YOUTH MOVEMENTS

Youth typically refers to the ages fifteen to twenty-four or eleven to twenty-nine. Analysts view youths as intellectually idealistic, psychologically impatient, practically inexperienced, socially liberal, and politically radical. Since they often lack a socially defined position in society, they tend to demand more far-reaching changes in society than their elders. Youth movements also bear these characteristics.

Although youth movements are modern phenomena, youths' collective involvement in politics is not new to the Middle Eastern societies. The futa'awwawa brotherhoods in medieval periods consisted of semireligious, voluntary, urban, youth organizations engaged in acts of chivalry (jawan-mard) protecting the less fortunate, supporting public causes, and at times acting in parallel with official security forces. Though not always viewed positively or engaged in benevolent acts, the futa'awwawa groups represent early forms of collective action by youths in Muslim societies. These youth organizations imposed strict ethical standards on their members and required strong group loyalty.

Youth movements in the Middle East emerge in the context of politics or popular culture. Youths express themselves through sports, music, and dress. Because most Middle Eastern states are undemocratic, officials have considered the rise of independent social movements a threat to political stability. Any issue that captures youths' attention, even if nonpolitical in nature, takes on a political character, and state officials respond accordingly, exerting control and resorting to repression.

The region's youth movements are usually connected to broader changes under way in society, especially political and cultural developments. Influenced by such developments, these movements in turn intensify the broader changes. For instance, in 1908, drawing young members of the military, a liberal opposition movement known as the Young Turks forced the Ottoman sultan, 'Abd al-Hamid II (r. 1876–1909), to restore the constitution and parliament that he had suspended in 1878. Youths were also energetic partners in most anticolonial struggles. In Iran, young people, especially university students, were an important force in the push to nationalize the oil industry in the early 1950s. Nowhere have youths' struggles been more intense and persistent as in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, where they have borne the burden of two major uprisings, the Intifada (1987–1988) and Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000–2002). Youths also fought most
fervently during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and in the war that resulted in the withdrawal of the Israeli military from south Lebanon in May 2000. In the 1970s and 1980s, both leftist and Islamic associations grew in countries as far apart as Egypt and Pakistan, polarizing university campuses.

Having little stake in the status quo, young people join opposition groups hoping to create an “ideal society.” Both governments and their opponents exploit youth’s abundant idealism and impassioned activism. Because oral traditions are prevalent in Muslim societies, religious and political leaders use their speaking skills to establish credibility, cultivate charisma, and recruit and mobilize followers, particularly youths. In the late 1950s Egypt, Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser’s (1918-1970) powerful lectures drew youth support for his policy of Arab unity. During the 1970s, ‘Ali Shari’ati’s (1933-1977) oratory won over Iranian youths to his radical Islamic ideology. In the 1980s and 1990s, ‘Abd al-Karim Sorush’s (b. 1945) deft use of language has similarly appealed to Iranian youths in the Islamic Republic, who sympathize with his liberal Islamic ideology. Often, religious leaders attract youths to their political causes through mosques or underground networks, as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen), founded in 1928, and the Iranian Fedayyen-e Islam, created in 1945, have shown.

In societies marked by limited upward political and economic mobility, student movements enable youths to crack the system and open up spaces for participation in the politics. Many nationalist leaders began their political socialization in student organizations. Realizing this fact, governments also try to recruit students to their administrations. In the early 1970s, the Shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980), undermined the growing power of the Confederation of the Iranian Students in the United States and Europe by luring its leaders to lucrative government posts. The Saudi and Kuwaiti governments have likewise co-opted their young opposition and with greater success than the shah.

The correlation between the emergence of youth movements and economic decline is not strong in the Middle East. Since most youth movements are sociocultural and political, they have arisen during both economic prosperity and decline. In the 1970s, a guerrilla movement emerged in Iran as the oil export boom brought new wealth. During the mid-1990s, pro-reform students formed a movement, reacting to the last decade’s political developments rather than to poor economic conditions. The relationship between youth movements and the Iranian state has been discontinuous. When in late 1940s, Mohammad Mosaddeq (1880-1967), then elected prime minister, launched a campaign to end the British control of the Iranian oil industry, students backed both his stance as well as his antidemocracy efforts. However, once the CIA-supported coup ended Mosaddeq’s government in 1953, restoring the monarchy, the student movement opposed the shah’s rule by using both violent and nonviolent tactics.

In the political arena, the locus of Middle Eastern youth movements is often universities. Where allowed, political organizations and parties establish subsidiaries in universities for recruitment and mobilization. Where outlawed, opposition groups still operate on campuses underground for political agitation and recruitment. In the absence of serious political parties in many societies, student movements become the principal advocates of ideological and political trends in society and a vanguard of change. In the 1980s and 1990s, a host of sociological variables has contributed to the rising expectations among the youth and created fertile grounds for youth activism. In 1998, 40 percent of the Middle Eastern population was under fifteen years old, as opposed to one-fifth for the developed world. The general decline in oil prices around the world, coupled with increasing population, has led to economic decline in the Middle East. Unemployment, aggravated by the increase in the rate of rural-urban migration and urbanization, has led to disenchanted among the youth making further demands for education, social freedom, jobs, housing, and resources for establishing a family. These factors have delivered frustrated youth to extremist ideologies, especially Islamic fundamentalism. The 1990s has witnessed massive recruitment among the youth by Islamic radicals like HAMAS in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Jama’a Islamiyya in Egypt, the Mobilization (Bajis) Forces in Iran, and al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan.

The most interesting demographic change has been a sharp increase in the number of young women in Middle Eastern universities outnumbering men in a number of fields. In the second decade of the revolution in Iran, more females studied in various fields, despite official restrictions. In Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, the governments encouraged female participation in most aspects of social and political life. Among the Persian Gulf countries, Kuwait, Yemen, and Oman have developed policies promoting female education and social participation, but except in Kuwait, success has been generally slow and limited.

The dominant features of student movements in the region are radicalism, intellectual idealism, anti-authoritarianism, anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, and nationalism. The scope of these movements is national and the respective state apparatus are their targets of attack. Iran’s student movement exemplifies these characteristics the best. A close look at this movement will demonstrate the dynamics and diversity of the student movement in the region.

The Student Movement in Iran
Before mass protests erupted against the Pahlavi regime in 1978, the Iranian student movement splintered into Islamic, liberal, and Marxist factions. The secular or non-Islamic associations, the strongest and largest groups, had ties to the guerrilla movement operating outside of universities. The Muslim associations comprised a small segment of the student movement and had loose contacts with Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini (1902–1989) and the Freedom Movement of Iran. All these associations cooperated to topple the regime. During the shah’s final years, students initiated the process that culminated in revolution. Student poetry readings, lecture series, and political forums were catalysts in a chain of events that crippled the old regime. In 1977, when demonstrations against the shah became widespread, the student associations recruited many members, organized numerous rallies in major cities, and became supporters of Khomeini’s call for the shah’s departure.

Once the revolution succeeded, students expanded their activities, joined revolutionary forces, and occupied numerous properties belonging to the fleeing former officials. By the time Khomeini returned to Iran, student associations had established de facto headquarters for their respective groups in universities. Faced with the tasks of institution and state building, the clerics considered student demands as obstacles to the consolidation of their power, using the Muslim Student Organization as an instrument to challenge its secular counterparts.

On 4 November 1979, after an earlier attempt by the Marxist organization, the Iranian Fedaiyan Organization, a Muslim student group engaged in the boldest and most consequential act in the history of student activism in Iran: the seizure of the U.S. Embassy and the holding of American diplomats as hostages for 444 days. Khomeini endorsed the takeover, capitalizing on this event to undermine opposition to his new theocracy. In 1980, the secular student organizations were effectively outlawed and their members physically attacked by the religious vigilantes. Muslim student associations identified and helped to arrest non-Islamic students, sabotaging their political and cultural activities. This was the first time ever that elements of the Iranian student movement turned against each other. Later, Khomeini ordered universities closed until purged of un-Islamic elements and the grounds laid for their Islamization. He created the Council for Cultural Revolution to review faculty and students’ activities as well as university programs. Many activist students and faculty members were fired or arrested for their affiliations with political groups.

When universities reopened two years later, leftist, nationalist, secular, and opposition students and professors were gone, with new Islamic and ideological criteria defined for admission and recruitment. Female students were barred from studying certain disciplines. In addition to meeting educational criteria, students had to show commitment to Islamic values and have an untainted moral history. Until Khomeini’s death in 1989, these restrictions remained in force, although students and the faculty had devised mechanisms of resistance.

In the 1980s, numerous Muslim associations were formed at colleges. New admission quotas for war veterans and the armed forces’ families enabled these associations to grow. These associations encouraged student participation in government rallies, reported on antigovernment activities and faculty criticisms of the state ideology, and implemented state gender policies by monitoring male-female interactions on campus. In short, the student movement, formerly an active, independent, creative, and antiestablishment force, was transformed into a watchdog of the state, alienating most students who feared religious vigilantism and spying by the government. These associations lost their appeal among students who felt increasingly apathetic and disenfranchised. Although these associations’ members were closely affiliated with the regime and some occupied government positions, conservatives still suspected some students whose nonconformity and radical outlook they found troubling. Conservative religious organizations established parallel Islamic student associations in the universities to discourage unfavorable and unpredictable activities by others.

Sociological and political factors during the revolution’s second decade inspired another momentous rise in student and youth activism. According to the Secretariat of the Supreme Council of the Youth, of 60,055,488 total population in 1997, 40.4 percent, or 24,248,768, were eleven to twenty-nine years old—a 37.3 percent increase since 1987 and more than 104.7 percent growth since 1977. With the doubling of the population between 1978 and 1996, the number of institutions of higher education increased as well. Alienation, disillusion, and frustration among youths intensified. Islamic vigilantes constantly interfered in youths’ and women’s lives, compelling them to obey strict religious codes of behavior.

After 1988, Iran’s clerical establishment split into two major factions. With the decline of the Islamic leftists’ fortunes during the 1989 to 1996 period, the student organizations lost their influence within the government. Many of its influential members began careers in political journalism. Radical individuals who had served in high-ranking positions during Khomeini’s rule were isolated and pushed to the background. President Mohammad Khatami’s election in 1997 breathed new life into the student movement. An unprecedented coalition of dissatisfied youths and women, politically isolated supporters of the Islamic left, and other segments of the public voted for Khatami. A new chapter in student activism had begun.

New student organizations emerged, and activists challenged the conservative faction’s authority within the Islamic Republic. Reacting to broad support for Khatami in universities, the conservatives introduced measures to depoliticize students and asserted more control over their organizations. All these measures failed, ironically reinvigorating student activism. As the conservatives blocked Khatami’s reformist policies, students marched in his support. As student demonstrations against the judiciary and the conservative faction multiplied, one of the protests, on 8 July 1999, led to a deadly
attack on a student dormitory in Tehran by Islamic vigilantes and the police. This attack provoked three days of student uprisings in Tehran and several other cities in that month.

After these uprisings, the government cracked down on the students, leaving them alienated, agitated, and restless as they looked for any opportunity to express their frustrations. Protests spilled over from the universities to the soccer fields, cinemas, and music concerts. Disturbances in various cities following the loss of an international soccer game by the national soccer team in 2001 highlighted widespread discontent with the status quo. In November 2002, students started a series of mass protests at a death sentence passed against Hashem Aghajari, a reformist university professor, for alleged blasphemous remarks about clerics in Iran. In early June 2003, students began a new round of protests in commemoration of an attack on a student dormitory on 9 July 1999. Most of these irregular and spontaneous protests have lacked a clearly articulated political agenda. The government's systematic efforts to weaken the student movement have led youths to become more spontaneous and momentum-driven. Most protests have begun as friendly gatherings rather than as a result of any organization or planning. In fact, the ruling clerics have successfully crushed these protests, despite their persistence, because the students lack organization, goals, and leadership. At the end of February 2003, the students' Office for Consolidating Unity finally expressed its disillusionment with President Khatami by withdrawing its support for the reformist camp in the local elections. A number of student organizations have emerged since, demanding an end to theocracy and the establishment of a secular government based on the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Conclusion
During the 1990s, youths in the Middle Eastern countries, especially Iran, have shown a strong desire for Western cultural icons, music, and arts, as they reject the imposition of undemocratic, traditional, and strict policies on their lives. Part of this desire for more freedom is due to the limitations imposed by the states. However, part of it is a demonstration effect: The communications revolution and globalization of local regional economies have stimulated youth's attraction to a material lifestyle as well as to the cultural norms and political freedoms typically identified with Western societies. Government authorities have resorted to various means to
Yusuf Ali, ‘Abdullah

Yusuf Ali was the son of a police officer of Gujarati parentage. With communal Muslim schooling in Bombay, he looked beyond his Bohra Sh’ite origins and was extremely concerned about the fate of Muslims in British India and beyond. But he was very successful in achieving the highest rank in British schooling. He earned a scholarship at Cambridge, and after graduation won a place in India’s civil service. Yusuf Ali honored these two traditions, British and Muslim Indian, with equal vigor. For his devotion to the British cause in the First World War, he was awarded the title of Commander of the British Empire. He was called upon to represent loyal British Muslims against pan-Islamic tendencies in India. Yet, he was still respected by Muslims like Muhammad Iqbal, who called upon him to head a Muslim school.

Yusuf Ali, however, was more than an anglophile and communal Muslim. His translation of the Qur’an represents the kernel of his ideas on Islam, mysticism, and progress. In addition, he wrote a number of pamphlets and articles on Islamic issues in which he took a critical stance on both Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Sir Muhammad Iqbal. His was a vision of Islam that stood on an equal footing with other religions, just as he viewed Indian Muslims on an equal footing with the family of nations.

In the closing years of the twentieth century, Muslims revisited the legacy of Yusuf Ali’s widely read translation. Perturbed by the modernist and mystical tendencies in his translation, Islamist groups have tried to expurgate his commentary of so-called unorthodox leanings.

See also Qur’an; Translation.

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Ali Akbar Mahdi

YUSUF ALI, ‘ABDULLAH
(1872–1953)

Author of the most widely read English translation of the Qur’an, ‘Abdullah Yusuf Ali presents a unique figure in Islamic modernism at the turn of the twentieth century.